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Abstract
This article focuses on labor courts, most of which are ‘mixed’ in that a professional judge sits with lay judges. It traces the organization 
and operation of these courts in several countries, finding considerable variation. It also examines a range of criteria to determine labor court 
effectiveness. It concludes that effectiveness depends on the perception of the stakeholder and also on the criterion that is adopted: a labor 
court that scores highly on one criterion, May not do so on another. Accordingly, there is no best model.
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Introduction
The decrease in trade union membership and collective regulation 
and the growth of statutory and/or contractual legal rights for the 
individual employee across much of the developed world has led to 
an increased role for adjudicatory institutions in resolving 
employment disputes [1]. With employment disputes likely to rise as 
unemployment, dismissals and employment insecurity spread in the 
wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, such adjudicatory regimes are 
likely to become yet more significant.
Labor Courts
Some countries, both large and small, (for instance the United 
States of America (USA) and the Netherlands), use the ordinary civil 
court for the adjudication of employment disputes, while Italy has a 
hybrid: a specialist chamber in the civil court and Japan allows 
claimants to choose between the ‘ordinary’ civil court and a labor 
tribunal.
This article focuses on bespoke adjudicatory regimes for 
employment disputes and we use the generic term ‘labor court’, 
although the nomenclature varies by country [2]. Labor courts are 
frequently justified on the grounds that the workplace is special and 
so a separate court is needed. Furthermore, to underline the special 
nature of labor courts, in some countries the professional judge sits 
with lay judges. Such lay judges, while not required to be legally 
qualified, are appointed because of their workplace experience either 
as a worker or an employer/manager. Countries with mixed labor 
courts (i.e. professional and lay judges together) include Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia, Sweden, UK [3].
In most countries lay judges are appointed after nomination by
trade unions and employers’ associations and commonly a
professional judge sits with two lay judges, one drawn from the trade
union/worker side and one drawn from the employer/manager side,
each having an equal vote. Accordingly, the lay judges can outvote
the professional judge, although this rarely occurs. Exceptionally
France has four lay judges (two from each side), while in Sweden’s
labor court mostly there are seven judges: two professional judges, a
labor market expert, two employee lay judges and two employer lay
judges [4].
In nearly every country the lay judges sit with the professional
judge in all cases. Exceptionally in France, the four lay judges meet
without a professional judge to adjudicate and only if they fail to
agree (which happens in about 20 per cent of cases) is a professional
judge brought in to break the tie [2]. In contrast in Britain, the
professional judge sits alone in many cases and lay judges (one from
each side) essentially only sit with the professional judge on
employment discrimination cases. Research suggests that many
British lay judges feel that this limits their contribution as they rarely
sit on dismissal cases where their workplace knowledge is most
useful. Instead, they sit on legally complex discrimination cases
where workplace issues are rarely relevant [5].
In most countries there are gateways to adjudication in the form of
mediation or conciliation. These two words are often used
interchangeably and, unlike adjudication, the claimant and
respondent both agree voluntarily to accept the decision. Commonly,
such mediation is carried out by a professional judge alone, although
unusually in France it is by the lay judges alone, while in Japan it is
by the professional judge and two lay judges together [3]. If there is
no settlement, an adjudicatory hearing ensues.
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In Britain and New Zealand conciliation/mediation takes place in
institutions separate from the labor court: respectively the Advisory,
Conciliation and Arbitration Service and the Mediation Service [4].
South Africa, too, has a separate institution, the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), which often carries
out con/arb: if the parties do not resolve their dispute through
conciliation, the dispute is then arbitrated by the same ‘commissioner’
[6,7].
Effectiveness
This summary indicates that labor courts vary in their organization
and mode of operation, but which institution is the most effective,
effectiveness cannot be measured by a population’s litigiousness
because that varies by country, for instance according to the ease in
which a labor court claim can be lodged, the extent of employment
rights and the availability of administrative dispute resolution bodies
[8]. Similarly, effectiveness cannot be measured by the number of
appeals from the labor court, because the opportunity to appeal
varies. In the UK, for instance, it is limited to a point of law; but in
Germany appeals are allowed where the amount in dispute exceeds
a certain amount of €600 [4].
Over 50 years ago, a British Royal Commission [9]. Set out four
criteria of labor court effectiveness ‘easily accessible, informal,
speedy and inexpensive’. When comparing countries, however, one
does not find a labor court that score highly on every criterion. For
instance, currently British labor courts are inexpensive: a British
claimant does not have to pay any fee to make a claim and the
parties do not have to have legal representation. Yet Britain’s labor
court procedure is not informal: a hearing often lasts several days.
Apart from often voluminous written evidence, witnesses are cross-
examined and afterwards a long judgment is handed down,
summarizing the relevant law, setting out findings of fact and giving
the reasons for the decision, with any dissent noted [2].
In Germany, self-representation is also allowed and although there
is a hearing fee, it is only paid by the loser after adjudication.
Furthermore, although in Germany it often takes some months to
obtain a labor court hearing, the hearings themselves are speedy:
typically, four or five cases are heard in a morning based on
paperwork previously submitted and short oral submissions. In
Japan’s labor court, not only has the claimant to pay a hearing fee at
the outset based on a sliding scale related to the amount claimed, but
mostly there are legal costs too: unless express permission is
granted, the parties have to have legal representation. Yet the court
is informal. Japanese professional judges do not wear robes (unlike
their German counterparts) and there is a round table, unlike
Germany where there are separate tables facing each other. (In
Britain the judges’ table is on a dais) [3].
Another criterion is whether the judges have expertise. Often trade
unions and employers’ associations, when nominating lay judges for
appointment, carry out some, albeit informal, quality control.
Unusually in Great Britain, there is a system of open recruitment. As
in many occupations, a British person seeking to become a lay judge
answers an advertisement and fills in an application form; then, after
short-listing and, crucially, a successful interview, he/she is appointed
to either the worker panel or the employer panel. Research suggests
that selection by interview has poor predictive validity [9]. On the
other hand, such an appointment system militates against nepotism
and has increased gender and ethnic diversity. Indeed, a few women
reported that self-nomination, introduced in 1999, had enabled them
to apply direct, whereas previously they had been blocked by senior
males in their organization [2].
Arguably the more training lay judges have, the more expertise
they acquire, but once again there is variation. For instance Japan’s
trade union confederation (Rengo) requires, and its employers’
confederation (Keidanren) recommends, that those interested in
becoming a lay judge first participate in a three-day training program
in individual dispute resolution, funded by the government, but
delivered by a private institution. Furthermore, after appointment, the
court provides training annually. In contrast, there is no mandatory
training for German lay judges either before or after appointment,
although some labor courts and some trade unions provide training
[3].
There is variation also in professional judges’ expertise. Most
countries have a career judiciary and so the professional judges
know little about the workplace and have to rely on their lay judges. In
contrast British professional judges are only appointed after several
years’ experience as lawyers, where perhaps they will have gained
some knowledge of workplaces, albeit indirectly, through those they
have represented [2].
Unusually in France, as noted above, a professional judge only
comes in where the four lay judges cannot agree. These French
professional judges are usually judges in district courts specializing in
other areas of law. Research indicates that at least some French lay
judges prided themselves on knowing more about employment law
than the professional judge [3].
Satisfaction with the labor court is another criterion, but there is a
paucity of information. A British survey found that 57 per cent of
claimants and 85 per cent of employers believed that the labor court
hearing gave them ‘a fair chance to make their case’, but attitudes
were clearly related to case outcomes [7]. In Japan, where the
claimant can choose between the civil court or the labor court,
statistics suggests that the popularity of the labor court has risen
more steeply than that of the civil court. This figure, however, should
be treated cautiously: monetary compensation can be awarded to
resolve a dismissal dispute in Japan’s labor court, but not in Japan’s
civil court, which can only award reinstatement or reengagement [2].
Yet a further criterion is whether legal norms are propagated.
Normally, labor court hearings are open to the public and decisions
are publicly available, although the detail of such decisions varies
from country to country. Unusually in Japan all labor tribunal hearings
are closed to the public and decisions are only available to the parties
[3].
Discussion and Conclusion
In summary, this article finds that labor courts vary from country to
country. Yet this is not surprising: countries differ in their history,
industrial relations context and legal system. Certain commonalities
emerge however, including pre-hearing conciliation/mediation, lay
judges’ role and training and the extent of professional judges’
expertise. This article also finds that it is well-nigh impossible to
gauge the effectiveness of labor courts, as that depends on the
criteria adopted. Whereas labor courts in one country may score
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highly on one criterion, the same labor courts may score less well on
another criterion. Furthermore, different stakeholders may give one
criterion more importance than another. For instance, claimants may
rate inexpensiveness more highly than the propagation of legal
norms, but professional judges may take the contrary view. Thus,
although comparisons can be useful, as they enable a deeper
understanding of an individual national system and an appreciation of
the different approaches that can be adopted, they do not point to a
best model.
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